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BEING DAPHNE'S MOM: AN ARGUMENT
FOR VALUING COMPANION ANIMALS AS
COMPANIONS
VASILIK AGORIANITIS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

I have no need for an alarm clock. Every morning without
fail, the repeated and increasingly frantic cries of "Where's my
mommy?" alert me to the fact that the time has come to get out of
bed. The first thing that I do every day after having been
awakened in such a manner is get my daughter Daphne and take
her into the kitchen, where I prepare a breakfast that we share.
As with any parent, my first thoughts in the morning are of
Daphne, and likewise, she is the last thing that crosses my mind
before I fall asleep at night. Although the sentiment is the same,
there is one big difference between me and most parents with
whom I am acquainted: my daughter is not a human being to
whom I have given birth, but rather a little green Quaker parrot
whom I adopted from her biological mother when she was less
than six months old. While some may scoff at my affection for this
animal, I cannot help but feel the strong bond of love that unites
parent and child when she cocks her little head to one side, looks
up at me, and asks for her mommy.
Whether or not one can identify with these feelings, one
cannot deny that companion animals play an integral role in
today's society
Their importance in our lives can be seen in
everything from the rise in the availability of animal-oriented
products and services, to people's reactions to the most destructive
of natural disasters. In the wake of the recent devastation caused
by Hurricane Katrina, there was not only a concerted rescue effort
directed at human victims, but there was also tremendous concern
for the animal companions that many people were forced to leave
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1. See William C. Root, "Man'sBest Friend: Property or Family Member?
An Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and its
Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL.

L. REV. 423, 423 (2002) (citing various statistics underlining the important
role that companion animals play in our society, and indicating that most
people view their companion animals as family members).
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behind. Indeed, many of the images from the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina depict frantic and distraught residents of New
Orleans roaming the vestiges of their former homes and towns in
search of the animals that many of them consider to be the only
family they ever had.
This comment will explore the role of companion animals in
the law and propose several necessary steps that courts and
legislatures must implement in order to ensure that companion
animals are valued as true companions, and not just as property.
Part II of this comment will discuss the traditional legal
characterization of companion animals as property. It will also
explore how courts and legislatures have attempted to lessen the
harsh impact of that characterization on guardians whose
companion animals are wrongfully killed or injured.! Part III will
then analyze the extent to which judicial and legislative attempts
at compensation have been successful in recognizing the fact that
companion animals are more than mere property. Finally, Part IV
will propose changes in current judicial and legislative actions to
ensure a legal characterization of companion animals that
adequately reflects the increasingly important role companion
animals play in modern society.
II.BACKGROUND
A. Mere Property: The TraditionalApproach
At common law, companion animals were not considered to be
property because they were thought to be economically useless
creatures kept solely for the personal enjoyment of their
guardians; thus, the loss of a companion animal was not
compensable at law because its economic value was virtually
nonexistent.' However, as society changed, courts slowly began to
allow limited recovery for the loss of companion animals.4 Today,
2. For this Comment, I have chosen to follow Debra Squires-Lee's
designations of what most people refer to as "pets" and "owners" rather as
"companion animals" and "human guardians." I too believe that the former
designations wrongfully connote property values, rather than suggesting the
close bond of companionship and love that can be shared between human
animals and those animals of a different species. Debra Squires-Lee, In
Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1059 n.2 (1995).
3. See Lisa Kirk, Note and Comment, Recognizing Man's Best Friend:An
Evaluation of Damages Awarded When a Companion Pet is Wrongfully Killed,
25 WHITTIER L. REV. 115, 118 (2003) (explaining that common law courts
based their refusal to characterize companion animals as property on the fact
that they served no specific purpose, but were "kept solely for the 'pleasure of
their owners'").
4. As one commentator has explained:
As man's concerns about the treatment of animals increased, animal anti-
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companion animals are legally considered to be property, the
destruction of which gives rise to monetary damages.'
Traditionally, the legal approach to recovery for loss of
property is based on the property's fair market value.6 Thus,
because companion animals are legally considered to be personal
property, the fair market value is the majority-approach employed
by courts when determining how to award damages for the loss of
a companion animal.]
In McDonald v. Ohio State University Veterinary Hospital,
plaintiff Janice McDonald's eight-year old show dog was severely
injured by a negligently performed surgery.8 In that case, the
court held that because dogs are considered by Ohio law to be
personal property, the usual market value method of recovery was

cruelty societies were formed. The activities of these societies and the
growth of other humane treatment organizations spurred state legislatures
The
to enact animal anti-cruelty and humane treatment laws.
development of extensive and varied programs consisting of legislative,
judicial and independent recognition of the "rights" of animals show that
the property rights of animal owners are conditioned in ways that do not
exist with respect to the ownership of inanimate personal property.
Harold W. Hannah, Animals as Property ChangingConcepts, 25 S.ILL. U. L.J.
571,571 (2001).
5. See Kirk, supra note 3, at 118 (discussing the law's characterization of
companion animals as property).
6. See McDonald v. Ohio St. Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750, 752
(Ohio Ct. Cl. 1994) (explaining that according to Ohio law, dogs are considered
to be personal property, and that the standard measure of recovery used for
valuation in cases of loss of personal property is the market value standard).
7. See Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456
(Alaska 1985) (concluding that because the legal status of dogs is one of
personal property, courts generally limit the recovery of damages for the
wrongful death of an animal "to the animal's market value at the time of
death," although special exceptions have been allowed in cases of "working
dogs"); Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W.2d 884, 892 (Neb. 1999) (discussing the
majority's characterization of animals as personal property as being consistent
with Nebraska law, and therefore as barring any recovery for emotional
distress resulting from the negligent destruction thereof); Gill v. Brown, 695
P.2d 1276, 1277 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (holding that because the proper
measure of damages for the tortious destruction of personal property is the
fair market value of the property, the plaintiffs' claim for mental anguish
damages for the death of their donkey is barred); Oberschlake v. Veterinary
Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 811, 812-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (detailing
the Ohio legislature's explicit characterization of dogs as personal property
having "all the rights and privileges," and being subject to the same restraints
as "other livestock," and thus declining to consider the plaintiffs' claims for
noneconomic damages arising from the injury of their dog).
8. McDonald, 644 N.E.2d at 751. The dog in McDonald was a "notable
eight-year-old imported male German Shepherd pedigree," whom the plaintiff
had spent much time and effort in training as a sport dog. Id. The dog also
performed stud services approximately five times, thereby yielding a total of
thirty-one puppies, before becoming paralyzed by the surgery. Id.
8. Id. at 752.
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appropriate to determine damages.' However, the court noted that
market value is a "standard not a shackle," and found that where
market value is not readily ascertainable, other factors may be
considered in determining the value of the property."
In
McDonald, the court allowed recovery based upon such factors as
the dog's unique pedigree and the amount of time and effort that
McDonald had spent training him." However, lest the distinction
between appropriate and inappropriate factors considered in
damage awards in companion-animal cases was to be blurred, the
court pointed out that "[s]entimentality is not a proper element in
the determination of damages caused to animals.""
B. JudicialDiscretion:Toward a More
Appropriate Valuation of Companion Animals
The law's persistent characterization of companion animals as
personal property has consistently impeded courts in awarding
damages for their loss. However, more and more courts have
attempted to circumvent the consequences of that characterization
by allowing greater recovery to companion-animal guardians
based on a variety of factors. 3
1.

Awarding Damages for Mental Distress

In City of Garland v. White, a city police officer shot and
killed the White's three year old male boxer after receiving a call
from a neighbor who alleged that the dog came onto her property
several times and charged at her. 4 In reviewing the facts, the
9. Id.
10. Id. "The court finds the market value for a dog of Nemo's caliber to be
merely a guideline." Id.
11. Id. The court noted that the standard employed when a companion
animal has no ascertainable market value is that of the animal's "actual
value" to his owner, which includes factors that make a particular animal
unique to his owner. Id. In this case, the expert testimony presented
indicated that Nemo's market value could range from minimal to $10,000. Id.
Thus, to avoid the confusion apparently inherent in attempting to determine
Nemo's market value, the court used the "actual value" standard, which,
because of such exceptional circumstances, it deemed a "better standard than
what the article would bring in the open market." Id.
12. Id. Inherent in, and essential to the court's decision to award "actual
value" damages was the assumption that all of the plaintiffs efforts to
rehabilitate Nemo after the paralyzing surgery were solely in an attempt to
recoup her economic investment, and not due to any emotional attachment she
might have to that animal. Id.
13. See Squires-Lee, supra note 2, at 1077 (examining various legal
rationales relied upon by courts in circumventing the traditional market value
approach to companion animal valuation).
14. City of Garland v. White, 368 S.W.2d 12, 14-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
There was conflicting evidence concerning the dog's character as being gentle
and docile. Id. at 14. The police officers involved in the killing of the dog
testified that, when they first arrived, the dog was on a neighbor's property,
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Court of Civil Appeals of Texas upheld the lower court's award to
the plaintiffs of $300 for the fair market value of the dog prior to
his death and of $200 for the physical pain and mental anguish
that Talmadge White suffered from witnessing the killing of his
dog.15
In LaPorte v. Associated Independents, the Supreme Court of
Florida upheld a damage award based on mental suffering.'6
While the plaintiff was making breakfast, her miniature
dachshund Heidi was tethered outside of the house."
After
collecting the trash, an employee of the defendant garbage
collecting corporation hurled the empty trash can at Heidi. 8 When
the plaintiff came outside to find her dog injured, the collector
but that after one of the officers shot him, the dog ran back to the White
residence, jumped into a car, and then ran toward the White's garage when
the three officers started advancing toward him with a shotgun. Id. at 15.
The officers did not contest the evidence that the dog was not advancing
toward them nor acting in a threatening manner at the time they shot him.
Id. Nor did the officers contest the evidence that they made no inquiry
whatsoever as to the dog once they arrived on the White's property. Id.
15. Id. at 17. In upholding the lower court's award of $200 in damages for
the mental anguish that Talmadge White suffered, the reviewing court
pointed to the evidence presented by White indicating his nervousness,
frustration, and related absence from school caused by witnessing the killing
of his dog. Id. The defendant police officers argued that the mental anguish
award was not supported by the evidence, but the appellate court found that
White had indeed presented sufficient evidence of the mental anguish and
resulting physical pain he suffered as a result of the police officers' unjustified
killing of his dog. Id. The court did not draw a clear line between the physical
pain and mental anguish suffered by White, and it is unclear whether or not
the court would have awarded mental anguish damages for the killing of the
animal if the anguish had not been accompanied by attendant physical pain.
Id. Other cases have suggested, however, that mental anguish suffered
because of the tortious killing of a companion animal may in and of itself be
compensable at law. See Gill, 695 P.2d at 1277-78 (suggesting that the
plaintiffs may have a cause of action for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress if they could allege and prove that the defendants' conduct
was "outrageous" and that the mental anguish the plaintiffs suffered was
"severe"); Langford v. Emergency Pet Clinic, 644 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994) (granting summary judgment against a companion animal
guardian because of her failure to prove that the defendants' conduct was
intentional or reckless, and that the plaintiff suffered severe mental anguish,
thus implying that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress could
exist if these two elements had been met).
16. LaPorte v. Associated Indeps., 163 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 1964). The
judge at the trial level instructed the jury that the plaintiffs mental suffering
was a proper element to consider in awarding the plaintiff damages for the
death of her dog. Id. at 267. However, on appeal, the appellate court reversed
that decision for reconsideration of the amount of compensatory and punitive
damages, holding that the plaintiffs mental anguish over the killing of her dog
was not a proper consideration in determining her damage award. Id. at 26768.
17. Id. at 267-68.
18. Id. at 268.
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laughed and left. 9 Heidi later died from the blow." In upholding
the plaintiffs damage award, the Supreme Court of Florida noted
that "the affection of a master for his dog is a very real thing and
that the malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of
damage for which the owner should recover."'
The court
emphasized the defendant's malicious conduct as a basis for
allowing the plaintiff to recover damages for her mental
suffering."
The court in LaPorte allowed recovery through a new cause of
action, based on malice, for emotional distress in cases involving
companion animals. 3
This cause of action afforded greater
opportunity for recovery to companion animal guardians because it
circumvented the necessary elements of both the intentional
infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") and negligent infliction of
emotional distress ("NIED") causes of action. 4
Thus, while

19. Id.
20. Id. The court found immaterial the evidence presented by the plaintiff
as to the physical effects she suffered because of her mental anguish, and
narrowed its focus to the question of whether or not the issue of mental
suffering was a proper consideration for the jury in its determination of
damages.
21. Id. at 269. The Supreme Court of Florida discussed the appellate
court's holding that generally, in the case of injury to or destruction of an
animal, recovery is limited to the market value of the animal, and that the
sentimental value of the animal to the owner is an improper factor to consider
in awarding damages. Id. at 268-69. Although the Supreme Court declined to
distinguish between "sentimental value" and "mental suffering," it is clear
that the court felt uncomfortable with the majority's characterization of
animals as mere property, and with the necessary limitation of damages to the
animal's market value. Id.
22. Id. at 268. The court in LaPorte followed a rule set forth by a previous
Florida Supreme Court decision, which distinguished between mental
suffering in the context of intentional or malicious conduct and mental
suffering in the context of negligence, for which recovery could only be had if
the mental suffering were accompanied by physical injury. Id. Thus, because
of the court's characterization of the defendant's actions as malicious and
evincing an "extreme indifference" to the rights of the plaintiff, the court
allowed for punitive damages based on the plaintiffs mental suffering. Id.
23. See Squires-Lee, supra note 2, at 1078 (explaining that Florida
broadened the scope of its emotional distress cause of action to allow for
recovery in cases in which the elements of IIED or NIED cannot be satisfied,
by creating the malicious infliction of emotional distress cause of action).
24. Id. To recover for the tort of IIED, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
defendant intended to cause the plaintiff emotional distress, (2) the
defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, (3) the defendant's conduct
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's emotional distress, and (4) the
plaintiff's mental distress was of such a serious nature that no reasonable man
could be expected to endure it. Langford, 644 N.E.2d at 1037. Most courts
hold that for a claim of NIED the plaintiff must have been related to the
victim as parent-child, grandparent-grandchild, spouse, or sibling, in order to
recover. Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001). Thus,
because the relationship between companion animals and human guardians
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generally declining to recognize a cause of action for intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress based on the death of a
companion animal, courts have nevertheless employed various
rationales in their attempts to appropriately value companion
animals.
2.

Loss of Companionship

Loss of companionship is based on the concept of consortium,
Given this
which arises out of the marriage relationship.
association, courts have generally declined to consider such an
element when awarding damages in companion-animal cases.2 5
Although companion-animal guardians have argued for the
establishment of a separate cause of action based on the loss of
companionship of their companion animals, courts have uniformly
refused to create such a cause of action. 6
Recognizing that significant bonds of companionship can and
do exist outside the confines of marriage, some courts have
extended the concept of loss of companionship to include recovery

does not fall into one of these legally-recognized categories, a claim for NIED
is generally barred in the context of companion animals. Id.
25. See Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (explaining
that because companionship is an element of consortium, which is a "right
growing out of a marriage relationship," there can be no recovery under
Pennsylvania law for the loss of companionship of an animal, which is
considered by Pennsylvania law to be personal property); see also Squires-Lee,
supra note 2, at 1082 (remarking on the historical expansion of the concept of
consortium from being premised solely on conjugal rights between a husband
and wife to include claims for the loss of a spouse's companionship and
affection, and noting the inherent inconsistency of courts that recognize the
value of the human-companion animal relationship, but refuse to allow
compensation for loss of companionship in the context of a relationship that
many people consider to be just as valuable as their relationships with other
humans).
26. See, e.g., Jankowski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1085
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (considering the specific question of whether an
independent cause of action for the loss of companionship of an animal exists
in Illinois). Here, the plaintiffs brought a claim against the defendant animal
hospital and two of its employees after their dog died from negligently
administered anesthesia. Id. Although the plaintiffs could have, under
existing Illinois law, brought an action for negligent damage to or destruction
of property, they chose to bring a claim for loss of companionship before the
court, expressly disavowing any property damage claim. Id. The plaintiffs
acknowledged that Illinois law characterized dogs as personal property, and
thus only allowed market value recovery, but asked the court to recognize an
independent cause of action for the loss of companionship of a companion
animal. Id. The court, acknowledging that the loss of companionship cause of
action has been extended in Illinois beyond the marital relationship to a
parent-child relationship, nevertheless refused to further extend that cause of
action to human-companion animal relationships, stating that such an
extension would be inconsistent with Illinois law. Id. at 1087.
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based on such other relationships as parent and child.27 A New
York trial court in Brousseau v. Rosenthal took this expansionary
trend one step further when it ruled that loss of companionship
was an appropriate element to consider in awarding damages to a
guardian for the loss of her companion animal.' The Brousseau
court based its theory of recovery on the animal's "actual" value as
opposed to its market value, because the latter was incapable of
calculation under the circumstances." The court recognized that
the loss of her dog was a painful and traumatic event for the
plaintiff, and that in order to be adequately compensated for that
loss, the plaintiffs emotional damages, including the loss of
companionship of the dog, should be taken into account. 30 Thus,
while remaining within the traditional confines of the legal
characterization of companion animals as property, courts

27. Id.; see also Squires-Lee, supra note 2, at 1099 n.164 (listing examples
of courts that have extended their loss of consortium claim to include
relationships such as parent-child, sibling, and unmarried cohabitants).
28. Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
The dog in Brousseau was a healthy, eight-year-old mixed breed that had been
given to Ms. Brousseau as a puppy shortly after the death of her husband. Id.
The testimony in the case indicated that the plaintiff, a retired widow living
alone, relied heavily on the dog's watchdog qualities and never left the house
at night alone without him. Id. Ms. Brousseau delivered her dog to the
defendant's kennel for boarding, and was told when she returned to retrieve
him that the dog had died. Id. at 285. Although Ms. Brousseau consented to
having an autopsy performed on her dog, the defendant, Dr. Rosenthal,
produced no report, and proffered only contradictory explanations as to the
dog's death. Id. at 286. The court determined that because the goal of the
action was to compensate the plaintiff for her loss, to the "meager extent that
money can make her whole," the unusual circumstances of the case mandated
the inclusion, in the damage calculation, of not only the dog's protective value
to the plaintiff, but also of the loss of companionship that Ms. Brousseau
suffered due to the death of her dog. Id. at 286-87.
29. Id. at 286. The sympathetic Brousseau court reasoned that, "[allthough
the general rules and principles measure damages by assessing the property's
market value, the fact that Ms. Brousseau's dog was a gift and a mixed breed
and thus had no ascertainable market value need not limit plaintiffs recovery
to a merely nominal award." Id.
30. Id. at 286-87. It should not be overlooked that the Brousseau court, in
using the "actual value" standard by which to measure damages, did not go
beyond the scope of the traditional legal concept of companion animals as
property. Id. at 286. Rather, the court, in allowing the plaintiff to recover for
the loss of her dog's companionship, found a way of circumventing the
necessary harshness of limiting recovery in companion animal cases to the fair
market value of the animal, thus evincing a certain level of discomfort with
the very notion that companion animals are mere property. Id. at 286-87. In
reading the Brousseau opinion, this value judgment manifests itself through
the court's use of such language as "it would be wrong" to reject the traditional
approach to calculating damages, and in determining that the dog's
companionship must be legally acknowledged for the plaintiff to be fully
compensated for her loss. Id.
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following the Brousseau example have begun to extend the concept
of loss of companionship to the companion animal context.
C. Legislative Attempts at Companion Animal Valuation
Tennessee was the first state to go beyond the scope of the
common law when it enacted legislation dealing with the wrongful
death of or injury to companion animals; however, several other
states have also proposed similar legislation."1 Tennessee's T-Bo
Act of 2000 permits a companion animal guardian to recover
noneconomic damages for the "loss of the reasonably expected
society, companionship, love and affection of the pet."" However,
the statute's narrow definition of "pet" includes only dogs and cats.
Moreover, recovery for the death of a "pet" is limited to $5,000, and
the statute specifically exempts governmental agencies and
veterinarians from liability.3 Proposed legislation in other states
goes beyond the scope of the Tennessee statute by allowing greater
economic damages, expanding the definition of "pet," and explicitly
allowing for damages caused by the negligence of veterinarians.'

31. See Elizabeth Paek, Fido Seeks Full Membership in the Family:
Dismantlingthe Property Classificationof Companion Animals by Statute, 25
HAw. L. REv. 481, 517-18 (2003) (detailing the circumstances surrounding the
proposal and enactment of the Tennessee statute commonly referred to as "TBo"). Paek explains that Tennessee Senator Steve Cohen proposed the bill
after his Shitzu, T-Bo, was wrongfully killed by another dog. Id. at 517.
Senator Cohen sued in small claims court and was only allowed to recover TBo's medical expenses. Id. The Senator was precluded from bringing a claim
based on the emotional distress he suffered as a result of T-Bo's death because
companion animals were considered to be property. Id. See also Elaine T.
Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful Death Cases:A Survey of
Current Court and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary
Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215, 226-30 (2003) (discussing
Tennessee's T-Bo Act of 2000 and surveying proposed and/or failed legislation
in other states).
32. T-Bo Act of 2000, TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2003). The statute
does not distinguish between intentional and negligent conduct on the part of
the defendant, except to the extent that if the conduct resulting in the death of
the "pet" is negligent, the death or fatal injury must have occurred on the
"owner's" property, or while the "pet" was under the control and supervision of
the "owner." Id. The statute also specifies that the limitation on noneconomic
damages does not apply to causes of action for IIED or "any other civil action
other than the direct and sole loss of a pet." Id.
33. Id.
34. See Byszewski, supra note 31, at 226-30 (examining proposed
legislation in states other than Tennessee, and detailing statutory similarities
and differences among the various proposed legislation and Tennessee's T-Bo
Act of 2000). The proposed California legislation would limit the amount of
noneconomic compensation recoverable for the death of a companion animal to
$4,000, which, like Tennessee's T-Bo Act, would take into account the
"reasonably expected society, companionship, love, and affection of the pet."
Id. at 226. The limitations of the proposed California bill are also similar to
those of T-Bo. Id. Damages resulting from negligence would be limited to
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III. ANALYSIS
The courts' inconsistency in determining the appropriate
value of companion animals has led to confusion and uncertainty
about those animals' proper place in society and in the law." The
first part of this analysis will compare and contrast the
implications that arise from the courts' various methods of valuing
companion animals in the context of their status as property. The
second part of this analysis will discuss the implications of the
characterization of companion animals as property and will
address various arguments that have been made in favor of
changing that status. The last part of this analysis will consider
the extent to which legislative attempts at providing a uniform
method of valuation of companion animals have and have not been
successful.
A. Inconsistency and Paradox:Market
Value, Actual Value, and Sentimental Value
The majority of courts limit the amount of damages
recoverable for the loss of a companion animal to the animal's fair
However, in an attempt to provide relief to
market value."
guardians whose companion animals have no ascertainable
market value, such as in the case of mixed breeds, courts have
allowed recovery to be determined by the animal's "actual value"
to her guardian." Thus, if a companion animal guardian can prove
those cases in which the animal was injured on the property of the owner, or
while under the owner's care. Damages would not be allowed in cases in
which the defendant is a nonprofit or governmental agency, in cases in which
the killed or injured companion animal had previously killed or worried
another animal, or in cases in which the defendant is a veterinarian. Id.
In contrast to both T-Bo and to California's proposed legislation,
Colorado's proposed bill would allow noneconomic damages of up to $100,000,
and would make no exemption for veterinarians. Id. Yet, unlike most of the
other legislation dealing with the death of companion animals, the proposed
Massachusetts bill does not mention noneconomic damages, but rather
includes loss of a companion animal's companionship in the calculation of the
animal's fair market value; nor does the bill limit the dollar amount of
recovery. Id. at 227.
Other interesting aspects of various proposed legislation include: the
use of the term "domesticated pet" as opposed to "companion animal" or simply
"pet," as employed by T-Bo (Mississippi); and, the limitation of damages for
loss of companionship to $500, and the requirement that the injured
companion animal must have been "on the premises of its owner, unlawfully
removed from the premises of its owner, or under the direct control and
supervision of its owner" (New Jersey). Id. at 227-28 (emphasis added).
35. See Kirk, supra note 3, at 126-29 (noting the contradiction inherent in
court decisions that acknowledge the close, oftentimes familial relationship
between human guardians and companion animals, but refuse to take that
relationship into account when awarding damages).
36. Id. at 126.
37. See McDonald, 644 N.E.2d at 752 (holding that although market value
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that her companion animal has an ascertainable market value, her
recovery will be limited to that value; however, in cases in which a
companion animal has no ascertainable market value, recovery
will be based upon the more flexible actual value standard, which
may, at the discretion of the court, include such elements as loss of
companionship.'
This inconsistent and paradoxical system of
valuation leads to confusion among companion-animal guardians
(and courts as well), by placing a higher value on property that in
the open market has virtually no value, and by devaluing property
whose value can be ascertained with certainty.
A similar problem arises when courts recognize the bond
between companion-animal guardians and their companion
animals, but refuse to allow recovery for that bond. 9 Although
some courts have gone beyond only awarding market value
damages, most courts are still hesitant to focus on the importance
of the bond between a companion animal and a human guardian.
These courts instead choose to allow expanded damages based on
the guardian's mental distress or the willful and malicious conduct
of the defendant. ' Indeed, most courts that have refused to allow
damages in companion animal cases based on IIED or NIED, or on
loss of companionship as a separate cause of action have
emphasized the idea that even though a strong emotional bond
may exist between a companion animal guardian and the
is the normal standard employed by the courts in determining damages for the
death of a companion animal, a court may also employ the more flexible actual
value standard, which allows for consideration of various factors beyond
market value that make a companion animal uniquely valuable to his human
guardian in cases in which the market value of the animal cannot be "feasibly
obtained").
38. Compare Richardson, 705 P.2d at 456 (concluding that because a dog
has the legal status of personal property, the lower court was correct in
excluding the plaintiffs' "subjective estimation of Wizzard's value as a pet" and
limiting the plaintiffs' damages to the market value of the animal), with
Brousseau, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 286-87 (holding that the difficulty of measuring
the pecuniary value of the plaintiffs loss should not bar her from recovering
damages from the death of her dog, and that in order to make the plaintiff
whole, the loss of the dog's companionship and protective value must be
considered).
39. See Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d at 798 (acknowledging the longstanding
bond between humans and animals, but nevertheless holding that the law's
characterization of animals as personal property bars the plaintiff from
bringing a claim for emotional distress based on the loss of her dog).
40. See Gill, 695 P.2d at 1277-78 (holding that although the plaintiffs could
not recover for their emotional damages in the context of their property
damage claim, recovery could be had for these damages in connection with the
independent tort for HIED, if the plaintiffs could prove that the defendant's
conduct was "outrageous" and that the plaintiffs' mental distress was
"severe"); LaPorte, 163 So. 2d at 268-69 (allowing the plaintiff to recover
emotional damages for the loss of her dog where the defendant's conduct was
"malicious and demonstrated an extreme indifference to the rights of the
petitioner").
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companion animal, that bond is not legally recognized, and
therefore cannot serve as a basis for recovery. 41
Rabideau v. City of Racine is illustrative of the public policy
concerns courts have used in declining to allow the relationship
between a companion animal and guardian to serve as a basis for
recovery in cases in which recovery has traditionally been limited
to certain legally recognized relationships.42 In Rabideau, after
describing the longstanding relationship between dogs and
humans, the court nonetheless declined to allow the plaintiff to
recover for the emotional distress she suffered as a result of her
dog's death.'
The court's decision, based on "well-established
public policy criteria," expressed concern that a legal recognition of
the relationship between the plaintiff and her dog would open the
door to claims for emotional damage arising from relationships
between humans and any other type of animal. As the court
reasoned: "Humans have an enormous capacity to form bonds
with.., an infinite number of other beings that are non-human. " "
The court's "floodgates" argument does not address the
fundamental question of why the relationship between humans
and nonhuman animals should not be legally recognized. This
argument does, however, express a general distaste, shared by the
majority of courts, for allowing that relationship to stand on equal
legal footing with relationships between human beings.' While
courts have difficulty articulating exactly why relationships
between humans and nonhuman animals should not stand on
equal footing with other legally recognized relationships,
companion-animal guardians find no difficulty at all in expressing
why they should: because the relationship between a companionanimal guardian and her companion animal is as important as any
other relationship in her life.

41. See Fackler, 595 N.W.2d at 892 (disallowing the plaintiffs' claim for
emotional damages based on the negligent killing of their horses because
although '[pleople may develop an emotional attachment to personal
property," the law's very characterization of animals as property precludes
recovery for its negligent destruction); Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d

689, 691 (Iowa 1996) (holding that in order for the plaintiffs to recover
damages for emotional distress, they would have to be related to the victim as
a spouse, or be "related to within the second degree of consanguinity or
affinity").
42. Rabideau, 697 N.W. 2d at 799.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Jankowski, 510 N.E.2d at 1086 (distinguishing the loss of
companionship cases on which the plaintiff relies from the case at bar on the
basis that the former involved "human beings, not dogs").
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B. Like a "PrizedSchool Ring": No More Than Property.?"
Despite whether we consider our companion animals to be
family members, the majority of courts continue to characterize
these animals as items of personal property. However, at the
same time, most courts that find themselves constrained by the
animals-as-property paradigm express an intrinsic discomfort with
that notion.47 In Johnson v. Douglas, the Supreme Court of New
York recognized the fact that many people consider their
companion animals to be members of the family, yet refused to
allow recovery for the plaintiffs' emotional distress caused by
witnessing the killing of their dog.' The court in Johnson was
primarily concerned with the idea that, were it to allow emotional
damage recovery based on the death of a dog, it could not
justifiably deny recovery to plaintiffs who suffered emotional
damage due to the destruction of other items of personal property,
such as "a family heirloom or prized school ring. "49
No legal analysis is required to explain the seeming
inconsistency of the Johnson court's disposition of the case and its
simultaneous expression of empathy for the plaintiffs. Just as the
court in that case was concerned about the legal implications of
allowing emotional damages based on one form of "property," we
should all be concerned about the social and moral implications of
allowing animals to be deemed legally equal to a "prized school
ring."' If animals are considered to be no more than items of
personal property, what is there to stop us from tossing them aside
when we tire of them, or from destroying them on a whim? 1

46. In ruling against allowing the plaintiffs to recover emotional distress
damages based on the negligent killing of their dog, the Supreme Court of
New York in Johnson v. Douglas likened companion animals to "a family
heirloom or prized school ring." Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628
(N.Y. 2001). Although most of us would consider this comparison to be
flagrantly offensive and intuitively wrong, it is illustrative of one of the main
problems to which the legal classification of companion animals as property

can lead.
47. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Rabideau, while denying the
plaintiffs emotional distress claim based on the death of her dog, pointed out
that though it was confined to analyze the case in a property context, it was

"uncomfortable with the law's cold characterization of a dog.., as mere
'property." Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d at 798.
48. Johnson, 723 N.Y.2d at 628.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. There has been much important case law, as well as scholarly theory,
suggesting that at the very least, companion animals should be considered as
a special category of property, conceptually distinct from real property. See
Paek, supra note 31, at 508 (discussing a Texas appellate decision in which the
judge recognized the fact that companion animals belong in a "unique category

of 'property' that neither statutory law nor case law has yet recognized").
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In fact, the law has already implicitly recognized that animals
are more than mere property by passing animal anti-cruelty
statutes.52 If animals were truly no more than property, there
would be no need for Congress to enact statutes that specifically
single out animals from all other types of "property" for special
protection.
Many important arguments for changing the legal status of
animals as property have been made in recent years.'
Such
arguments have generally been met with a backlash, as have
nearly all important social movements throughout history.' One
of the biggest concerns with the abrogation of animals' status as
property has been the idea that the elimination of that status will
lead to granting animals independent rights as individuals, which
would in turn lead to the breakdown of an economy that is partly
based on animal exploitation.55 Although this type of "floodgates"
argument may sound persuasive, the premise on which it is
founded is not sound. Abrogating animals' property status for the
purposes of tort law (i.e., allowing causes of action based on
emotional distress or loss of companionship suffered at the death
of a companion animal) does not necessarily imply that animals
should be given the same rights enjoyed by humans."
52. See id. at 513-14 (explaining that the very enactment of animal anticruelty statutes in all fifty states, as well as the more than sixty federal
statutes, impliedly acknowledges that animals are more than just property);
Squires-Lee, supra note 2, at 1071-72 (noting that, although tort law classifies
animals as personal property other types of law, exemplified by animal cruelty
statutes, recognize the fact that animals are different from personal property).
53. See GARY L. FRANcIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 177 (1996) (asserting that animal rights

activists will achieve no progress in the struggle for legal rights for animals as
long as animals have the legal status of property); Root, supra note 1, at 446
(proposing that by removing the property label from animals courts will
achieve greater flexibility in awarding damages in companion animal cases);
Paek, supra note 31, at 524 (arguing that the abrogation of animals' legal
status as property is necessary in order to accurately reflect modem social
values regarding companion animals).
54. Lisa Kirk exemplifies the typical concerns with the animal rights
movement worrying that the elimination of companion animals' property
status will lead to giving all animals "rights," which will in turn lead to "the
demise of the meat industry and possibly scientific experimentation." Kirk,
supra note 3, at 134.
55. Id.

56. As Harold W. Hannah states: "One of the reasons for removing the
property status from an animal is to permit its owner to recover for emotional
distress." Hannah, supra note 4, at 576. Hannah goes on to point out that the
basis for recovery in such a claim is the relationship of the animal and his
human companion. Id. While some people advocate the abrogation of the
property status of animals as a necessary step in the fight for complete animal
rights arguments like Hannah's demonstrate that others find the elimination
of animals' property status necessary only for the limited purpose of promoting
judicial recognition of the relationship between companion animals and
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C. DeconstructingLegislative Attempts
at Full Valuation of CompanionAnimals
As the first of its kind, Tennessee's T-Bo Act has been hailed
as a significant advancement in the fight for full valuation of
companion animals." The statute codifies the important value
that society places on companion animals by awarding
noneconomic damages for "loss of the reasonably expected society,
companionship, love and affection of the pet."58 Whereas courts
may employ various rationales for awarding (or not awarding)
noneconomic damages to a companion-animal guardian, the
Tennessee legislature explicitly provided that the statutory basis
for an award of noneconomic damages is the special relationship of
"society, companionship, love and affection" shared by human
guardians and companion animals. Other proposed legislation
dealing with companion animals has gone so far as to recognize
that "companion dogs and cats often are treated as members of a
family."5 9
The trend of legislative valuation of the relationship between
human guardians and companion animals is an inexorable
manifestation of the values of our modern society. But statutes
such as T-Bo create new problems that must be addressed before
the role of companion animals in the law can properly be
determined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted in
Rabideau, "Humans have an enormous capacity to form bonds
with dogs, cats, birds and an infinite number of other beings that
are non-human."' Yet T-Bo narrowly defines the term "pet" to
include only "domesticated dog[s] or cat[s] normally maintained in

human guardians. Allowing that relationship to stand as the basis for an
award of damages would reflect the real importance of that bond.
57. Elizabeth Paek calls Tennessee's enactment of the T-Bo statute an
example of an impressive advancement "in facilitating an animal guardian's
recovery of non-economic damages for the wrongful death of their companion
animal." Paek, supra note 31, at 517. See also Root, supra note 1, at 435
(noting that the T-Bo Act is a "positive development" in the struggle for
appropriate companion animal valuation and that T-Bo "provides a starting
point for other states to adopt similar statutes").
58. T-Bo Act of 2000, TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2003). The statute
places a limit of $5,000 on the non-economic damages that may be awarded for
the death of or injury to a companion animal, but subsequently specifies that
that limit "shall not apply to causes of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress or any other civil action other than the direct and sole loss
of a pet." Id.
59. Paek, supra note 31, at 519 (quoting general assembly findings and
determinations proposed in Section 13-21-1001 of Colorado House Bill 031260). Paek points out that the proposed Colorado bill would go beyond the
scope of T-Bo by far exceeding the maximum recovery of non-economic
damages for the death of a companion animal and by specifically including
liability for veterinarians. Id.
60. Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d at 799.
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or near the household of its owner. " " While it is true that dogs
and cats are the most common type of companion animal, the
statutory limitation of the definition of "pet" is an arbitrary
distinction that wrongfully excludes relationships between
humans and all other types of companion animals from the
protection of the law.6"
Another important limitation of T-Bo is that it specifically
exempts veterinarians, as well as nonprofit and governmental
organizations and their agents from liability.'
The idea of
providing special exemptions for veterinarians finds a notable
exception in only one proposed bill to date.6 The exemption of
veterinarians from liability for negligently causing the death of a
companion animal has drawn critical attention from many legal
commentators." While no explanation need be proffered for the
veterinary support of this exemption, a viable reason for its
existence has yet to be given, especially in light of the fact that
veterinarians are some of the most prevalent defendants in cases
involving the death of companion animals.'
To exclude
61. § 44-17-403(b).
62. Language employed by other statutory attempts at companion animal
valuation includes: "pet" (California), "companion cats and dogs" (Colorado),
"companion animal" (Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island), "domesticated
pet" (Mississippi), and "domesticated companion animal" (New Jersey).
Byszewski, supra note 31, at 226-29.
Thus, while several states have
expanded upon the definition of "pet" used in T-Bo, others have chosen to
employ a definition that, similarly to T-Bo, would restrict recovery to only
those cases in which a dog or cat is injured or killed.
63. Section (e) of the T-Bo Act provides "nor shall this section be construed
to authorize any award of noneconomic damages in an action for professional
negligence against a licensed veterinarian." § 44-17-403(e).
64. See Byszewski, supra note 31, at 226 (explaining that the companionanimal bill proposed in Colorado would specifically apply to veterinarians).
65. Elaine Byszewski explains that veterinarians should not be exempt
from liability for a companion-animal's injury or death because of the inherent
contradiction in the veterinary profession, itself built on and sustained by the
strength of the human/animal bond, yet, insisting that animals are mere
property for the purposes of litigation. Byszewski, supra note 31, at 230.
Byszewski insists that this type of contradiction is "morally bankrupt." Id.
Byszewski also points out that courts' inappropriate devaluation of companion
animals may lead to decreased levels of safety and consumption as there
would be, on the one hand, no pecuniary incentive for veterinarians to use the
requisite level of care when treating companion animals, and, on the other
hand, no way for companion animal guardians to "accurately assess whether
the risk of harm to their companion animal is worth engaging the veterinary
services." Id. Thus, Byszewski asserts that imposing liability for the death or
injury of a companion animal on veterinarians would both appropriately
acknowledge the human/animal bond on which the veterinary profession is
built, and increase market efficiency by deterring veterinary negligence and
ill-informed decision making by companion animal guardians.
66. See id. at 230-31 (rebutting the argument that drastic increases in
veterinary-malpractice insurance would result if liability were to be imposed
on veterinarians for the injury to or death of companion animals, by asserting
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veterinarians from liability for their negligence when they kill or
injure a companion animal is to effectively vitiate, with respect to
a considerable number of potential claims, the statutory goal of
expanded relief for companion-animal guardians."
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Counterbalancingthe Harsh Effects of the Lega
Status of CompanionAnimals as PersonalProperty
1.

Courts

a.

Expanding Existing Causes of Action

Though in recent years there has been an increasing number
of exceptions to the courts' general disallowance of emotional
distress/mental anguish claims arising out of the relationship
between humans and companion animals,' the majority of courts
continue to limit these causes of action (specifically, IIED and
NIED) to such well-established legal relationships as parent-child

that passing the cost of increased veterinary-malpractice insurance onto
consumers of veterinary services will not necessarily price these services out of
the market because companion animal guardians may purchase health
insurance for their companion animals).
67. See Root, supra note 1, at 441-46 (emphasizing the significant impact
that imposing liability on veterinarians for negligently causing the injury to or
death of a companion animal would have on the veterinary profession). Root
argues that though veterinarians have traditionally been shielded from
liability for emotional damages caused by their negligence in treating
companion animals, the imposition of such liability is necessary in order to
fully compensate companion animal guardians for their loss when a
companion animal is negligently injured or killed. Id. Root justifies the idea
of veterinary liability by pointing out the fact that "[tihe function of law is to
adapt to the ever-changing views of society," and argues that because society
clearly values companion animals as more than mere property, the law should
reflect that belief without discriminating on the basis of who the offender is.
Id. at 444. Root also notes that even though it is conceivable that veterinary
malpractice insurance would increase if veterinarians were held liable for the
emotional injuries caused by their negligence, the full effects of that increase
are too speculative to constitute a persuasive argument against imposing
liability, especially since many potential claims have been barred by the law's
characterization of companion animals as personal property. Id. at 444-45.
68. See LaPorte, 163 So. 2d at 268-69 (holding that although the general
measure of damages in the case of injury to or death of a dog is the market
value of the animal, awarding the plaintiff damages for the mental anguish.
that she suffered was appropriate when the conduct of the defendant was
malicious); Gill, 695 P.2d at 1277-78 (suggesting that the plaintiffs' allegations
that the defendant "negligently and recklessly" shot and killed their pet
donkey and that the plaintiffs suffered "extreme mental anguish and trauma"
as a result might, if proven, support a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The John Marshall Law Review

1470

[39:1453

and husband-wife. 9 If, however, as many courts have held, the
purpose of tort law is to "make the plaintiff whole,"" then courts
must be consistent in allowing plaintiffs to recover for the
emotional distress they suffer from the loss of a relationship that,
although not yet recognized by the law, nevertheless plays an
increasingly important role in our modern society.7
Given that most people consider their companion animal to be
part of the family,72 it is hard to imagine that they would feel the
loss of that animal any less intensely than they would the loss of
any other family member. Yet the law's refusal to allow the
relationship between human guardian and companion animal to
serve as a basis for emotional distress recovery constitutes a
persistent and arbitrary devaluation of this relationship that is
clearly out of sync with modern societal values.
To allow
companion-animal guardians to recover emotional distress
damages for the injury to or death of their companion animal,
courts must take the necessary first step and appropriately value
companion animals. The courts will thereby serve as a catalyst for
the law's recognition of the important role that companion animals
play in today's society.
b.

Creating a New Cause of Action

Loss of companionship is an element of damages traditionally
included in the concept of consortium, which originally arose out of
the marriage relationship. 3
Although there have been
69. See Fackler, 595 N.W.2d at 890-92 (upholding the lower court's grant of
partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on the
determination that Nebraska law does not support recovery for mental
anguish resulting from the destruction of personal property); Nichols, 555
N.W.2d at 691 (finding that the plaintiffs could not recover for the emotional
distress they suffered as a result of their dog's injuries at the hands of the
defendant for two reasons: (1) Iowa law requires that a plaintiff must actually
witness the tortious event giving rise to the claim, and (2) the plaintiff must be
related to the victim "within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity,"
nor did plaintiffs did not allege that the injury to their dog was malicious);
Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d at 798-99 (denying plaintiffs claim for NIED based on
the killing of her dog because the plaintiff was not "related to the victim as
spouse, parent-child, grandparent-grandchild, or sibling").
70. See Brousseau, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 285-87 (holding that in order for the
plaintiff to be fully compensated for the loss of her dog "to the meager extent
that money can make her whole," it was not only acceptable, but moreover
necessary to take into account the dog's protective value and the value of the
dog's companionship to the plaintiff).
71. See Paek, supra note 31, at 482-83 (citing statistics that indicate the
importance of companion animals in today's society, including the fact that
over eighty percent of companion-animal guardians consider their companion
animals to be family members).
72. Id.
73. See Daughen, 539 A.2d at 865 (explaining that "[clompanionship is
included in the concept of consortium, which is a right growing out of a
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exceptions, 4 the majority of courts remain consistent in their
refusal to consider the loss of a companion animal's companionship
when determining damages for the death of or injury to a
Intrinsic in the very term "companion
companion animal. 5
animal" and central to the role that these animals play in our lives
is the idea of companionship. Although it may be hard to put a
precise definition to the term "companionship," one court has said
that loss of companionship is based on an individual's "right
to... companionship, society and affection," which forms the basis
of the cause of action. 6
Just as courts have begun to recognize that the
companionship in relationships other than marriage is worthy of
compensation, 7 courts must now further extend that reasoning.
Any human who has ever shared his life with a companion animal
knows that the bond of "companionship, society and affection"
shared with that animal can be felt just as strongly, if not
stronger, than the bonds that unite humans. The very words with
which we refer to our companion animals suggest that we truly
value the companionship that these animals bring to our lives. A
uniform judicial allowance of a cause of action based solely on the
loss of companionship of companion animals is an integral step in
the fight for full legal recognition of the value of companion
animals.
2.

Legislatures

The goal of proper valuation of companion animals cannot be
achieved by judicial action alone. Federal and state animal anticruelty statutes have already implicitly recognized that companion

marriage relationship giving each spouse the right to the companionship,
society and affection of each other in their life together").
74. See Brousseau, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 286 (holding that because loss of
companionship is a well-established element of damages in New York, the
court must consider the loss of the dog's companionship in order to assess the
dog's actual value to the plaintiff).
75. See Daughen, 539 A.2d at 864-65 (refusing to allow consideration of the
loss of a dog's companionship as an element of damages in order to adhere to
the majority view that characterizes companion animals as personal property,
and thus allows recovery only for the fair market value of the animal);
Jankowski, 510 N.E.2d at 1085-87 (explaining that loss of companionship in
Illinois "has been recognized as an element of damages in cases brought under
the Wrongful Death Act," which would preclude recovery on the basis of the
relationship between human guardian and companion animal, as companion
animals are considered by the law to be personal property).
76. Daughen, 539 A.2d at 865.
77. See Jankowski, 510 N.E.2d at 1085 (pointing to the history of the
Illinois Wrongful Death Act as a rationale for the extension to other cases of
claims for loss of companionship in relationships, such as parent-child, that
fall outside the traditional scope of the claim for consortium).
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animals are more than mere property. 8 More recently, several
state legislatures have passed companion-animal valuation
statutes that constitute an important step in the law's recognition
of the important role that these animals play in our lives."9 The
very enactment of such statutes paves the way for the eventual
fulfillment of the goal to legally value companion animals in a
manner consistent with the value that we as a society afford them,
but this goal cannot be achieved if we allow ourselves to be content
with enactment alone.
In examining Tennessee's T-Bo Act, the first companion
animal valuation statute enacted, which has served as a model for
similar statutes in other states, it becomes clear that the
limitations of the statute constitute a real impediment to the goal
of proper companion-animal valuation." As anyone who has ever
shared her life with a companion animal other than a dog or cat
knows, "Humans have an enormous capacity to form bonds
with ... an infinite number of other beings that are non-human."8

Likewise, as any human guardian of any species of companion
animal knows, the fact that the wrongdoer, vis-A-vis the animal, is
a licensed veterinarian is immaterial in the context of the
guardian's emotional damages.8 Moreover, the restriction, on an
already limited emotional damage recovery, to $5,000u is
arbitrary, and cannot come close to compensating the guardian for
her actual loss. In order to achieve appropriate legal recognition of
the importance of companion animals, statutes such as T-Bo must
apply to all companion animals, must not provide exceptions for
licensed veterinarians, and must allow more than a nominal
monetary recovery for the emotional damages suffered from the
loss of a companion animal.
78. See Paek, supra note 31, at 513-14 (reviewing the history of federal and
state animal anti-cruelty statutes and determining that their very enactment
reveals a concern for animals' rights-at the very least for the right of animals
to be treated in a humane fashion-that implicitly acknowledges the fact that
animals are not property).
79. As the first companion animal valuation statute to be enacted,
Tennessee's T-Bo Act has largely served as a model for other similar statutes,

and has incited much commentary from legal scholars about the legislative
solution to the problem of companion animal valuation.
80. T-Bo limits the amount of noneconomic damages based on the loss of
companionship of the companion animal to $5,000, includes only dogs and cats
in its definition of "pet," and provides an exemption for licensed veterinarians.
T-Bo Act of 2000, TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2003). For a more thorough

discussion of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of T-Bo and its
limitations, see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
81. Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d at 799.
T-Bo also does not apply to not-for-profit or
82. § 44-17-403(e).
governmental agencies or their employees in actions for professional
negligence. § 44-17-403.
83. § 44-17-403(a)(1).
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B. Rejecting the Animals-as-PropertyParadigm
For most people, the idea of removing the property status
from animals necessarily connotes placing animals on an equal
level with human beings, giving the former all the rights and
privileges traditionally enjoyed by the latter. The response to
scholars who advocate the abrogation of animals' legal status as
property' has been a general concern that our modern society,
based to a certain extent on the exploitation of animals, would fall
apart if we were to remove the property label that currently
defines the legal relationship between human beings and
animals.' Although a complete animal rights agenda may be a
goal for some, a more appropriate and feasible solution, and a
solution that would not fundamentally interfere with our modern
societal and economic structure, would be to abrogate the property
status of animals in the law for the limited purpose of awarding
companion animal guardians proper compensation when their
companion animal is wrongfully injured or killed. This solution
would, practically speaking, be akin to considering animals as a
special type of property.
Nevertheless, due to the negative
connotations of possession associated with property in any context,
it would be better to consider animals as a special type of entity,
nonhuman, but nevertheless particularly capable of sharing a
strong bond of affection and companionship with humans that is
recognized under the law.
Changing the property status of
animals for the limited purpose of appropriately valuing
companion animals would allow courts and legislatures greater
flexibility to recognize and provide compensation for a relationship
that plays an integral role in our modern society.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has analyzed the law's current treatment of
the relationship between human guardians and companion
animals and its historical basis. It has proposed ways in which
the law may better reflect the growing societal importance of that
relationship. I challenge those who still think that companion

84. See Root, supra note 1, at 446 (advocating the removal of animals'
property status in order to reflect modern social values and allow courts more
flexibility in awarding damages in cases in which a companion animal is killed
or injured); Paek, supra note 31, at 524 (arguing that the property status of all
animals must be completely abrogated, and that the enactment of both state
and federal statutes currently provides the "strongest force in dismantling the
property status of companion animals").
85. See Kirk, supra note 3, at 134 (equating the abrogation of animals'
property status with giving animals independent rights on par with those
enjoyed by humans, and concluding that the problem of disparate treatment of
companion animals in the law can be solved from within the traditional
property framework).
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animals should be considered personal property to maintain that
conviction after seeing my own precious "property" look up at me
and ask for her mommy.

